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Introduction 
An open war between the United States led allies and the Syrian government 
of al Assad seemed almost inevitable when the ‘red line’ on the use of chemical 
weapons in the Syrian war imposed by Obama was conveniently broken. Naturally, 
these actions were quickly blamed on Assad as ‘irrefutable’ and ‘undeniable’ by 
those same countries that had been consistently advocating a military ‘solution’ to 
end the conflict. However, a combination of a deep rooted public aversion to 
another war and the so-called Russia proposal on securing the chemical weapons 
and avoiding a military conflict, for now, ultimately prevailed. This does not 
change the ultimate goal of the US-led allies, although it does momentarily close 
one window on how to achieve regime change.  
 There is a lot of literature on the issue of mass media being used to 
manipulate public opinion within the context of armed conflict (Snow, 2003; 
Willcox, 2005; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006; Bennett et al., 2007; Zelizer& Allan, 
2002). Many discuss the use of frames and narratives, which are used to guide the 
nature of the discussion (DiMaggio, 2009; Tuman, 2010;Nacos, 2007). There are 
also beginning to appear, academic articles on the Arab Spring, including those 
that take a less than positive appraisal of the situation. These are often taken from 
  
the point of view of ethics, law or political science (Siebens& Case, 2012; 
Friedman, 2011;Springborg, 2011). However, there are very few from a 
communication perspective on the issue of the Arab Spring and how it is managed 
(Khondker, 2011; Simons, 2013; Simons, 2012). This present article shall tackle 
the subject of understanding what happens when the goal stays the same, but the 
means of achieving have changed owing to events and opinion in the political 
information environment with the example of Syria post-August 2013.  
 Mass media articles shall be scoured for news items that relate to 
Syria, especially with regard to the situation where the message conveyed show the 
realities of the same goal, but changed means of attaining it. This makes news a 
valuable asset in the hands of capable influencers of public opinion. Therefore, 
there is a need to visit the original theoretical goals of news that pertain to the 
notion of being a public good. Then from this point to explore the reasons of how 
and why there should be attempts to manipulate the news.  
 The next section takes a look at the role of motivation and propaganda 
in the news. To explore how these two particular aspects are managed in order for 
the originator of the manipulated message to realise their goals and objectives. This 
lays the groundwork for introducing news reports within the theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks that have been elaborated. One of the bigger problems 
faced by those advocating for military intervention in Syria is that there are many 
different discrepancies and contradictions that have been surfacing, which has the 
effect of undercutting their sense of legitimacy, plus the basic communication 
problem of trying to support failed policies. For instance, by engaging in the region 
with military force and the notion of peace and democracy to the Middle East and 
North Africa through these actions, one only needs to look at the tangible results in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. 
Theoretical Role of News 
News is something that saturates the information environment, and can come 
in many different shapes and forms from many different kinds of media. So what is 
  
news exactly? Denis McQuail provides a concise definition. “The main form in 
which current information about public events is carried by media of all kinds. 
There is a great diversity of types and formats as well as cross-cultural differences, 
but defining characteristics are generally held to be timeliness, relevance and 
reliability (truth value)” (McQuail, 2010: 564). News can be found in many 
different shapes and forms, there are a number of common underlying conceptual 
commonalities though.  
One of the basic underlying assumptions and duties of journalism is to 
separate ‘facts’ from ‘values’ – i.e. the importance of objectivity in reporting. 
News was something that was seen as needing to be factual and non-partisan 
(Allan, 1999: 18). Therefore, there is an inherent commitment to the truth in news 
reporting. “The news frame’s tacit claim to comprehensiveness dictates that it must 
be seen as ‘balanced’ and ‘fair’ in its treatment of counter-positions” (Allen, 1999: 
64). Thus, there are many different automatic assumptions and claims when the 
word news is evoked.  
However, the format in which the news is told has been changing. In 
response to changes in the information environment, news is being presented in a 
more trivial and entertaining manner. Infotainment, the name given to this process, 
creates a much more descriptive rather than analytical approach to news reporting 
(Thussu, 2009). Armed conflict is one of those subjects in particular, which can be 
subjected to the infotainment format. “Covering wars is inevitably a difficult 
journalistic endeavour but the demand for live 24/7 news, as well as competition 
among news providers, can lead to the sensationalisation and trivialisation of often 
complex situations and a temptation to highlight the entertainment value of news” 
(Thussu, 2009: 113). Little is done by mass media in trying to adequately explain 
actual or proposed foreign policy, especially when the element of military conflict 
is present, instead there is a tendency to entertaining or promoting a certain path 
(Andersen, 2006: 82).  
  
The infotainment format of news lends itself well to supporting a policy 
position in an armed conflict. On the superficial level, news concerns being 
objective and telling the truth, which can have a legitimising effect in terms news 
projecting itself as an objective and enlightening activity. On the applied level, 
infotainment brings a level of shallowness to the news through it being very 
descriptive (and therefore lacking in analysis), which has the tendency to leave the 
event out of context. Under these circumstances, it is known that a war is in fact 
about to start or has already started. However, the underlying reasons for the 
conflict are not revealed. Infotainment also has a tendency to assign values to the 
different parties of a story, which includes identifying the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sides of 
a conflict.  
Related to the issue of infotainment, however, not the same issue, is the 
problem of spin entering the news sphere. Spin is a means and form of rhetorical-
based deception. “Spinners mislead by means that range from subtle omissions to 
outright lies. Spin paints a false picture of reality by bending facts, 
mischaracterising the words of others, ignoring or denying crucial evidence, or just 
‘spinning a yarn’ – by making things up” (Jackson & Hall Jamieson, 2007: vii). 
Mixed in with this problem is the problematic of the question, what has happened 
to the truth? As noted by academics, such as McQuail, truth, objectivity and 
verification are all essential elements of the news. The contrary has been noted, 
“perhaps, they speculate, in the new information age reality is simply a matter of 
belief, not anything objective or verified” (Kovach &Rosenstiel, 2010: 6). 
Ultimately, such as situation as the current one described above, when applied to 
the news industry leaves the public at risk from interest groups seeking to 
manipulate and exploit public perception and opinion.  
Manipulating the News: How and Why 
If one is able to control the ideas that the public are exposed and hence 
integrate in to their mind-sets this is a tremendous exercise of power over the 
public. During the experience of the United States’ Committee for Public 
  
Information, which was a propaganda institution that was used to create domestic 
public opinion support for entry into World War One and cultivate favourable 
views of the US among foreign audiences, laid the foundations for the way news is 
manipulated in the contemporary era. One of the means was to establish 
international news agencies or services that supplied the mainstream mass media 
with material that was likely to attain the stated objectives (Creel, 1920: 70-83). 
This is a matter of getting a message into the mainstream information flow in order 
to gain some kind of effect.  
Primarily, however, the engineer of consent must create news. News is not 
an inanimate thing. It is the overt act that makes news, and news in turn shapes the 
attitudes and actions of people. A good criterion as to whether something is or is 
not news is whether the event juts out of the pattern of routine. The developing of 
events and circumstances that are not routine is one of the basic functions of the 
engineer of consent. […] Newsworthy events, involving people, usually do not 
happen by accident. They are planned deliberately to accomplish a purpose, to 
influence our ideas and actions (Bernays, 1947: 119).  
As noted by Bernays, news is not something that is somehow random, it 
appears with a sense and a purpose. News helps to frame and shape public 
perception and opinion, to inform what issues are important and in what particular 
manner to think about them. Bernays noted once that “it is not surprising that the 
man who is outside the current of prevailing public opinion should regard the press 
as a coercive force” (Bernays, 1923: 94). With regards to answering the aspect of 
the underlying motivations for manipulating the news, it is related to public 
opinion and the need to appear to be working with public consent. 
For they [opinions] are derived, not necessarily by reason, to be sure, but 
somehow, from the stream of news that reaches the public, and the protection of 
that stream is the critical interest of the modern state. In going behind opinion to 
the information which it exploits, and in making the validity of the news our ideal, 
  
we shall be fighting the battle where it is really being fought (Lippmann, 1920: 
70). 
Here, Lippmann illustrates the importance and significance of news in 
shaping public opinion. However, Bernays takes the process one step more, by 
highlighting the need to instrumentalise news as a means of shaping that same 
public opinion in order to bring about the appearance of public consent. 
This phrase [the engineering approach] quite simply means the use of an 
engineering approach – that is, action based only on thorough knowledge of the 
situation and on the application of scientific principles and tried practices to the 
task of getting people to support ideas andprogrammes. Any person or organisation 
depends ultimately on public approval, and is therefore faced with the problem of 
engineering the public’s consent to a programme or goal (Bernays, 1947: 114).  
 The above mentioned quote builds upon the notion that the news 
production process is not something that is done by ‘accident’, but rather by a very 
deliberate well-planned and executed approach. As such, this answers the how part 
of the question. The why aspect of the question, is that this is carried out in order to 
try and direct and then harness public opinion and sentiment through manipulating 
their perception of selected events and people. This is done within democratic 
settings as this is a necessary façade to project and that government plans and 
policies need to be seen to follow public opinion, even if that opinion and therefore 
consent, has been engineered.  
The Role of Motivation and Propagandain News 
For the purposes of this paper, the term propaganda, shall be made according 
to the late Philip Taylor’s definition and understanding. 
The deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired 
way. Although I recognise that much of propaganda is accidental or unconscious, 
here I am discussing the conscious, methodical and planned decisions to employ 
techniques of persuasion designed to achieve the specific goals that are intended to 
benefit those organising the process (Taylor, 2003: 6).  
  
 It is important to emphasize that this is a deliberate and planned 
exercise that is intended to elicit a response from the targeted audience in a manner 
that benefits the messenger. Within the context of this article, propaganda is a form 
of passive mass communication from a messenger that seeks to gain some measure 
of gain by influencing a target audience. The target audience may have little ability 
to directly feedback in a symmetrical manner as these mass communication means 
are managed informational assets. To be successful in persuading and influencing 
audiences, a variety of factors need to be taken in to account, including 
adaptability.  
Successful propaganda depends on the adroit use of means under favourable 
conditions. A means is anything that a propagandist can manipulate; a condition is 
anything to which he must adapt. A propagandist can alter the organisation of his 
activities, modify the streams of suggestion which he releases, and substitute one 
device of communication for another, but he must adjust himself to traditional 
prejudices, to certain objective facts of international life, and to the general tension 
level of the community (Lasswell, 1927: 185). 
A lot of what is needed to manipulate the information environment already 
exists. However, there is an acute need for awareness concerning which tactics and 
mechanisms work and those that do not have an effect. In the event of an emerging 
informational threat, these are often managed in a specific time tested manner. 
There have been numerous examples, when confronted with inconvenient 
information, there is an attempt to use the strategy to nullify rather than conceal the 
unwanted ideas or information (Lasswell, 1927: 202).Thus adaptability and 
knowing which mechanisms to employ are key considerations.  
Bernays stressed that in order to be successful the communicated “themes 
must appeal to the motives of the public. Motives are the activation of both 
conscious and sub-conscious pressures created by the force of desires” (Bernays, 
1947: 118).However, a significant problem that was identified by Walter 
Lippmann in the Phantom Public, is that a mobilised and primed audience do not 
  
stay that way for very long (Lippmann, 1927: 103). Therefore, once an audience 
has been successfully mobilised it is necessary to act swiftly and before the same 
audience demobilises.  
 In a very frank book on the role and nature of communication in 
democracy, Bernays stated that one of the cherished presumptions is that every 
individual citizen makes up their mind of questions of public concern. However, he 
states that this is in fact a façade and instead the public is steered towards certain 
opinions and attitudes by a mixture of leadership and communication 
(propaganda). “From our leaders and the media they use to reach the public, we 
accept the evidence and the demarcation of issues bearing upon public question 
[…]” (Bernays, 1928: 38).Therefore propaganda acts as a mechanism between 
government and the people in a democratic society, seeking to make management 
easier by ‘guiding’ citizens into making certain decisions and choices (Ellul, 1965: 
121-132). The act of communication with the intention to bring about change in a 
target audience requires a certain sequence be followed in order to achieve an 
effect on that audience. 
“In supreme crises the dilemma is presented absolutely. Possibly a war can 
be fought for democracy; it cannot be fought democratically […] In the presence of 
danger, where swift and concerted action is required, the methods of democracy 
cannot be employed” (Lippmann, 1927: 180). On the subject of creating and 
shaping the environment of public opinion in such a manner as to benefit the 
agenda of a political actor involves the process of making a common will. To bring 
about a common will involves the transfer of interest. On the subject of the non-
contentious issue there is a great deal of detail and everything is clear and 
overwhelming. However, on the contentious issue or aspectit is very unclear and 
murky how this is to be achieved (Lippmann, 1922: 125-140). The state level actor 
is far from the only user of propaganda, especially in the current age of mobile 
communication technologies, where almost anyone can engage in communication 
with user generated content (Welch, 2013: 198). This does have the effect of 
  
multiplying the deluge of unverified opinion and misinformation that is posing as 
news and analysis.  
There needs to be some kind of motivating factor for the public in order to 
direct them in to consenting to the desired course of action. Syria is not Iraq from 
2003, where the idea and motivating factor that was used to gain public consent to 
what would otherwise be inconceivable was the use of fear (Snow, 2003: 73-83). 
When a sense of fear is instilled in a target audience, their ability to think logically 
and rationally is severely hampered. But after the deceit of the 2003 Iraq War has 
been uncovered the public are less inclined to fall for the same trick. So in this 
context the motivating idea revolves around the concept universal values 
(democracy, human rights, rule of law … etc.) and the feeling of revulsion (at the 
alleged levels of barbarity of the al Assad regime – therefore cannot negotiate with 
someone so inhumane).  
Now to move forward to taking a case in point, the Western policy and goal 
of regime change in Syria. The non-contentious issue is clearly defined by the 
West and those supporting the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, he must be removed 
from power. Justifications for this revolve around various alleged atrocities 
committed by the Syrian armed forces in the current war. When it comes to 
defining the contentious issue, it is much less clear. How should he be removed? 
There has been support of various armed factions and degrees of interference in 
Syria, up to the point of the abortive attempt to begin an open military action in the 
summer of 2013.  
News on Syria: Post-August 2013 
This section draws upon mass media articles and material that has been 
reported on by the mass media. Owing to the sheer breadth and width of the 
material that is available, the subjects/events of specific interest shall be narrowed 
down to three. The first deals with the issue and the consequences of the war that 
was on the verge of being openly waged, but was averted at the last minute. This 
had the effect of temporarily narrowing the available choices, including the then 
  
preferred military option, which has meant that new means for achieving the goal 
of regime change need to be manufactured. The second set of issues and topics 
relates to enhancing the negative attributes assigned to the Assad regime and 
therefore emphasize the need for change. For instance, the early predictions that 
the chemical weapons deal would fail, when this did not pass, then the lack of 
probability that the Assad regime would live up to its promises. A last point to 
analyse is the ‘revelation’ of the so-called industrial killing taking place in Syria by 
the Assad regime. The framing used in some political circles simply defies any 
reasonable response owing to the imposed level of oversimplification. Australian 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott characterised the Syrian Civil War as being ‘goodies’ 
versus ‘baddies’.8 
 Mass media and journalism are part of the problem, insofar as 
generating balanced and logical debate on the Syria issue. An opinion article in the 
Washington Times highlights a number of the problems. The opinion charged that 
“the media failed to provide a coherent understanding of what the United States 
should do and why. Columnists and commentators have used some of the most 
twisted logic to justify or oppose an active American role in Syria, including a 
diplomatic one. The media have become almost useless in helping their readers 
peer through the fog of discussion.”9Journalists have failed in their professional 
obligations to presenting fair and objective reporting that is in the public interest. 
 The issue of media serving political interest by their coverage of the 
Syrian conflict is apparent. One instance was the use of media by Obama to 
influence public opinion for war by using the images of people that were victims of 
a chemical weapons attack. “I’d ask every member of Congress and those of you 
watching at home to view those videos of the attack and then ask, what kind of 
world would we live in if the United States of America sees a dictator brazenly 
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violate international law with poison gas and we choose to look the other 
way?”10Obama is trying to use the infotainment value of the photos rather than any 
power of logical and concise argument to persuade the public to go to war.  
 Another story demonstrates the ease with which manipulations and 
propaganda passes through media, without being challenged or any signs of 
contrition from the media outlet concerned. Elizabeth O’Bagy did work at the think 
tank, Institute for War and Peace, specialising in Syria. Her work and advice was 
read and listened to by those in the Obama administration. In an op-ed to the Wall 
Street Journal, she did not declare her interest insofar as the think tank was a client 
of Syrian rebels. The op-ed she did concerned the level of infiltration by extremists 
into the Syrian opposition forces, a clear breach of ethics. A small note was added 
by the Wall Street Journal to the effect. O’Bagy was ultimately fired from the think 
tank, the reason given was that she claimed to have a doctorate from Georgetown 
University, which she did not.
11
 There was no attempt at either verification or 
publishing objective information.  
 These same professional ‘mistakes’ made by journalists occur 
repeatedly with some acknowledgement from media, but rarely with any form of 
contrition or apology. For example, the BBC made some confessions concerning 
the poor level of their coverage of events within the context of the Arab Spring. 
Helen Boaden, the Head of News at the BBC confirmed that journalists “got 
carried away with events and produced over-excited reports” Adding further that 
reporters embedded with Libyan rebels failed to explore both sides of the story 
properly. BBC’s Middle East editor, Jeremy Bowen was criticised for sometimes 
allowing excitement to “infect the reporting, which some viewers described as too 
emotive and veering into opinion.” In addition, some two thirds of mobile footage 
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and other user generated content was broadcast without any caveats.
12
Ultimately, 
the question needs to be asked, bearing in mind that these same ‘errors’ are made 
during the course of successive conflicts, are these really mistakes or part of a 
deliberate strategy to shape public opinion with the news?  
A War That Almost Was 
The basic intended script for Syria conflict is that it is a ‘spontaneous’ and 
popular local rebellion by moderates seeking to establish a democratic and free 
state. A notion of regime change is inherent in the process. There are many 
parallels here with other Arab Spring events, both in terms of the script and the 
reality of events. However, foreign jihadists are increasing greatly in numbers in 
Syria, at a rate that exceeds the flow of rebels into Afghanistan in the 1980s, with a 
minimum of 5000-10000 already present there.
13
The aims of some group are also 
far from the vision of democracy and freedom. In September 2013, an alliance of 
11 of the rebel groups publicly declared that they seek to create a “clear Islamic 
framework.”14In an interview on the CBS 60 Minutes programme, the former 
deputy director of the CIA, made a clear and chilling statement. “I fear the break-
up of the state of Syria, collapse of the central government, sectarian warfare, 
opportunity for al-Qaeda to have a safe haven in Syria that is not too dissimilar to 
the safe haven that it once enjoyed in Afghanistan.”15Given this recent background, 
the chemical weapons attack near Damascus in August 2013 provided what the 
US-led supporters for military intervention was the ‘prefect’ pretext to bring an 
end to the war in Syria and topple Assad.  
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 On 21 August 2013 there was a chemical weapons attack launched 
near Damascus. Obama and Kerry labelled this as “definitive” evidence of Assad’s 
guilt, in spite of launching substantial evidence identifying precisely who 
responsible for the attack. This fitted very conveniently with Obama’s red line 
narrative on the use of chemical weapons, and a chance to get directly involved in 
the armed conflict. The UN produced a report on the attack
16
 that was selectively 
used and interpreted by the US, France and Britain. For example, pointing to the 
type of rocket system allegedly used as ‘proof’ of the Syrian government’s guilt. 
The Syrian insurgent groups then used this as a means to try and give the US-led 
coalition the opportunity to get directly involved in the fighting. “The UN report 
offered damning and irrefutable evidence and clearly shows that only the Syrian 
regime could have carried out this attack.”17Different media accounts echoed the 
selectively picked and interpreted information from the UN report in order to try 
and build a solid case for war. The UN report, although it did prove that chemical 
weapons were used, never assigned blame to any one party.
18
 Language used to try 
and convey the guilt of the Assad government was not absolutely certain, relying 
on innuendo and suggestion in order to get this message across.  
This in turn fed into a narrative that discussed what level of military action 
should be taken in the West, led by the US, France and Britain. There was initially 
discussion of limited strikes as retaliation for the chemical weapons attack. 
Therefore, there was a shift from the tactic of “degrade” to “deter and degrade.” 
The original target list had included some 50 or so primary targets.
19
However, 
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once a war begins it is always much easier to expand the originally stated 
parameters to something bigger and more ambitious. There were some signs of 
dissent began to appear quickly. The former Commander of the USS Cole, which 
was attacked terrorists while docked in Aden, Yemen in 2001 was firmly against 
involvement. 
I think the first option we need to look at … is to not get involved in this 
conflict. While chemical weapons used is a moral outrage, that doesn’t define that 
our national security is in fact threatened to the point that we should take military 
action and get involved. We haven’t defined what the objectives are going to be in 
this conflict. […] We clearly have not been presented with the proof as the 
American people that the Assad regime has in fact launched those weapons. We 
need to see what the proof is so that we are not having a repeat like Iraq. We have 
no standing under international law to conduct these strikes right now.”20 
According to Seymour Hersh’s article in the London Review of Books the 
Obama administration “cherry picked intelligence to justify a strike against 
Assad.”21The article cited that some aspects of the intelligence report were 
highlighted and others omitted in order to create a suitable scenario that could 
allow public opinion to accept another war. Among the vital information omitted 
was the fact that actors other than solely the Syrian government have access to 
chemical weapons, such as Al-Nursa.
22
 The intelligence report started with the 
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assumption of guilt and then tried to find and manufacture evidence to support this 
claim.
23
 There were many inconsistencies in the intelligence report, a lot of which 
rested upon circumstantial evidence. For instance the claim that the traces of a gas 
attack disappear very quickly and that the UN inspection team had arrived too late, 
which was quickly proven false by experts in the field. Very precise deaths of the 
attack also raised suspicion – 1429 dead, including 426 children. Another point 
that attracted attention was the claim that US intelligence had picked up military 
signals traffic several days before the attack, concerning the intention to use 
chemical weapons.
24
If this was so, why were no efforts made to warn the civilians?  
 Reliance was made on the use of emotional and convolution in the 
report, which employs language tactics that some found comparable with the 
manufacturing of a war pretext in Iraq some 10 years earlier. The deceptive 
phrasing meant that different interpretations were possible, and meanings do not 
appear what they seem to be at first glance.
25
 A dozen former military and 
intelligence officials took the time to tell Obama that they information that they 
have on this case contradicted the official version of the story. “There is a growing 
body of evidence from numerous sources in the Middle East – mostly affiliated 
with the Syrian opposition and its supporters – providing a strong circumstantial 
case that the August 21 chemical incident was a pre-planned provocation by the 
Syrian opposition and its Saudi and Turkish supporters.”26One final piece of the 
puzzle, which adds to the already significant inconsistencies is the fact that the 
Syrian government had invited UN inspectors to the area in order to check on 
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allegations and claims of previous chemical weapons attacks on 18 August (three 
days before the attack).
27
 Why would they then launch a full scale chemical 
weapons attack knowing the inspection team was close and Obama’s warnings of 
the red line on the use of chemical weapons? 
 When the scale of the public backlash to the idea of another military 
campaign in the Middle East and North African region to topple another dictator 
became known, it would have been very difficult to continue the course and go to 
war. There needs to be some kind of sense or façade of legitimacy to the venture, 
which Syria did not, especially after the results of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya 
have come to fruition. The talk of war as the only option became rarer in face of 
such united opposition to the planned war. There were still some quips about an 
‘opportunity’ lost. The British Chief of Defence Staff, Sir Nicholas Houghton, 
gave a talk at the Royal United Services Institute in London where he warned that 
the United Kingdom was in danger of losing its ‘courageous instinct’ in 
international affairs.
28
 Britain’s Foreign Commonwealth Office also complained 
that the success of the negotiated settlement concerning Syria’s chemical weapons 
that averted increasing the complexity and intensity of the armed conflict through 
direct foreign military intervention did not ease the suffering of the Syrian 
people.
29
 However, the proposed logic of intensifying a war to help ease the 
suffering of ordinary Syrians seems to be somewhat counter-intuitive.  
In contrast to his position before the need to back down from waging war in 
the summer of 2013, President Obama also tries to present the option needed as 
being a political solution. Adding that, “I am not haunted by my decision not to 
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engage in another Middle Eastern war.”30Secretary of State John Kerry echoed 
Obama’s call for focus on a political settlement. “There is no military solution in 
Syria. […] There can be, there will be a political solution if everybody gets 
together and works for it.”31 British Foreign Secretary William Hague chimed in 
on this new message too. “No one should underestimate the difficulty of the 
negotiations ahead […] But we will not give up on diplomacy as the route to 
stopping the appalling bloodshed.”32NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen stated that “there is no military solution to the conflict in Syria” and 
that he did not anticipate “any further role” for the alliance in Syria. This 
contrasted to his statements after the 21 August 2013 chemical attack when he 
called for “a firm international response” (including military options).33With the 
original favoured option of military strikes being unpopular and discredited, as can 
be seen above, leading political actors in the West came to adopt the political over 
the military solution.  
 
Further Ways of Demonising and Obstructing the Assad Government 
Peace talks are bound to fail owing to the entrenched positions and the high 
price to be paid by the losing side. However, there needs to be some kind of mimic 
or imitation of the routine in order to try and show the public that ‘everything 
possible’ is being done to secure peace publicly, whilst continuing to pursue not so 
public plans that are at odds with the public façade. The script requires, within the 
realm of infotainment, that the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sides of a conflict be named and 
identified, to allow for public sympathy and support. In this regard, the negative 
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characteristics of Assad are emphasized and those of the ‘opposition’ are ignored 
or down played.  
 The threat of Syrian non-conventional weapons continues. There has 
been a large chorus from the US, UK and France that cast doubt and aspersions 
upon the Syrian government and their intentions and/or abilities to live up to its 
international commitments. With some five months remaining before the deadline 
of 30 June 2014 (the time by which the chemical weapon stocks need to be 
destroyed), the US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel, criticised the Syrian 
government for ‘dragging its feet’ on chemical weapons. “I do not know what the 
Syrian government’s motives are – if this is incompetence – or why they are 
behind in delivering the materials.”34 Such a statement seems to be apparently 
devoid of the realities on the ground, i.e. that Syria has been locked in a protracted 
civil war that makes movement difficult. Two storage sites of chemical weapons 
components that are readied for shipment came under rebel attack.
35
 There was no 
sign of international indignation or condemnation of these military strikes against 
the chemical weapons sites expressed by the West.Not to mention an enemy that is 
making that movement more dangerous, and likely to be using weapons supplied to 
them by the same Americans complaining about a lack of progress. 
 New rumours concerning possible weapon threats have begun to 
circulate in January 2014 too. These are based upon rumour and supposition and 
not upon concrete proof. Probabilities are converted into certainties. The Director 
of National Intelligence, James Clapper, launched into guesswork on an alleged 
biological weapons programme in Syria. “We judge that some elements of Syria’s 
biological warfare programme might have advanced beyond the research and 
development stage and might be capable of limited agent production, based upon 
the duration of its longstanding programme. […] To the best of our knowledge, 
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Syria has not successfully weaponized biological agents in an effective delivery 
system, but it possesses conventional weapon systems that could be modified for 
biological-agent delivery.”36 However, this new ‘discovery’ did not attract much 
media attention at the time, and given the level of deception used on the UN report 
to try and provoke the circumstances that would allow another war, people had 
become rightly suspicious and wary.  
Attempts are also used to try and manage perception of upcoming key events 
by the public, in order to try and consolidate the primary narratives. The Geneva II 
peace talks were more than likely to be doomed before they even started. However, 
the narrative performance stressed the cooperation from the opposition and the 
contrary from the Syrian government. A sticking point, and naturally enough, is to 
go to such talks with sets of pre-conditions and preconceptions. One of the starting 
points was the understanding that Assad should step aside and power would go to a 
transitional government. To reinforce the ‘legitimacy’ of this notion there were 
comments like those from US Secretary of State Kerry – “One man and those who 
have supported him can no longer hold am entire nation and a region hostage.” 
This is stemming from his alleged resorting to excessive brutality robbing him of 
his ‘legitimacy.’37Other events that occurred indicate that the talks would fail even 
before they began, however, the blame had already been assigned for this occasion.  
One of the events that highlighted the variety of obstructions that can be 
used was the delay of the official Syrian government delegation enroute to the 
Geneva talks via Athens. The scheduled route via Athens was to enable refuelling 
of the aircraft, on a path that had been pre-arranged and agreed to. However, when 
the plane landed, the Greek refuelling refused to service the aircraft and cited a 
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trade embargo imposed by the European Union. There was a resulting delay of 
about four hours, which threatened a special meeting the delegation had with the 
UN Sceretary-General.
38
Another point that demonstrated the selective manner of 
the peace talks was the nature of those who were invited. 
It is in the interests of genuine peace talks to include all parties engaged in 
the conflict to come to the table. If this does not happen, then not all of the parties 
are bound by any agreements that could result from the talks, thereby threatening 
any possible progress. Just a few days before the Geneva II talks, the UN 
Secretary-General caused a sensation with the announcement that he had invited 
Iran to the talks.
39
 As a result, the Syrian opposition, France and the United States 
mounted a campaign to have the invitation withdrawn. The reason given was based 
upon the demand that a series of preconditions must be accepted, which includes 
the acceptance of a need for a transitional government.
40
The predictable result 
being Iran’s invitation was withdrawn just 24 hours after being issued.41Ultimately 
the peace talks predictably failed. Equally predictably, the blame was levelled 
solely at the Assad government. “The regime is responsible for the lack of real 
progress in the first round of negotiations.” There was also a volley of symbolic 
rhetoric directed against the Syrian government by the London 11 nations (US, 
UK, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the 
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United Arab Emirates) for allegedly targeting civilians.
42
This only tells half of the 
story though, and does not answer the basic question, why should one side make 
all of the concessions that will ultimately lead to its demise without any 
inducements? Nothing was offered in return for making any sort of concessions, it 
is understandable that Syria would be reluctant to make them, especially when 
being lectured on ethics and code of conduct by parties responsible for arming and 
supplying their enemies. 
 
Killing on an ‘Industrial’ Scale  
One of the recurring themes that is played at most occasions when 
international military interventions are proposed is to have some kind of atrocity or 
war crime, often evidence happens to be ‘discovered’ at some critical and symbolic 
juncture in time. These stories are meant to cause a great sense of revulsion and to 
generate the demand for some kind of action to be taken. These alleged atrocities 
and war crimes often have strong connotations with the actions of Nazi Germany, 
just to emphasize how urgent and ethically and/or morally justifiable the following 
proposals are (often involving the use of military force).  
 A news story broke from 20-22 January 2014, concerning a story that 
alleged ‘industrial’ killing was being carried out by the forces loyal to Bashar al 
Assad. This story just so happened to break out on to the front pages of the 
international press immediately before the Geneva II peace talks that were 
scheduled to begin on 22 January 2014. Officials in the United States admitted that 
they had known about the photos of torture victims since November 2013, but had 
been trying to verify them. It is claimed that there are about 55000 pictures that 
indicate the deaths of some 11000 people.
43
The story was quickly circulated from 
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the Guardian and CNN, without any form of critical approach, toother leading 
Western and international media. 
 The photos were supplied by a defector, allegedly employed by the 
Syrian Military Police, to photographically document each of the bodies. These 
photos were showing scarred and emaciated corpses, which had been allegedly 
victims of the Syrian government. Given the codename Caesar, the defector was 
hailed as finally providing clear “direct evidence” of atrocities committed by 
Syrian government forces.
44
There was the predictable rhetorical reaction to the 
photos, mentioning the industrial scale killing of the Nazi death camps.
45
This 
particular manufactured crisis may be an attempt to try and bring back the open 
military option in Syria. “Mr Assad’s enemies say they hope the leak […] will 
cause enough revulsion in the West to prevent any deal that might leave him in 
place, or perhaps prod the West into more muscular steps to remove him, just as 
the Serbian massacre at Srebrenica in 1995 moved NATO to launch airstrikes in 
the Balkans.”46 
 Analysing the language used, especially when it came to the issue of 
ascertaining and projecting levels of certainty and credibility of the photos. On the 
surface there is an element of certainty concerning the validity and the significance 
of the photos, which is that Assad is guilty and this is proof of the level and scale 
of the killing. However, when subjected to a more detailed analysis the articles 
contained an embedded level of uncertainty. “So far, only a few photographs have 
actually been released by lawyers commissioned by the Qatari government, an 
avowed opponent of Mr Assad, and the claims about their origins could not be 
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independently verified.”47“These photos – if authentic – suggest that we may have 
only scratched the surface of the horrific extent of torture in Syria’s notorious 
dungeons.”48However, these details tended to be very limited, and were often 
buried under a much larger weighing of certainty and Assad’s guilt. The 
Independent characterised the findings as being a smoking gun and evidence of 
systematic killing.
49
An article in the World Post quoted almost solely evidence that 
supported the validity of the claims of torture by Assad’s security forces, using 
words like clear evidence, industrial scale killing and compelling.
50
Spiegel ran the 
headline Syria’s Bodies: ‘the stench was unfathomable.’51The news reports were 
clearly biased and aimed at establishing the guilt of Assad, rather than seeking to 
engage in an objective investigation into the merits and validity of the information. 
One significant question that is not broached, let alone answered is why would a 
regime engaging in crimes of such a nature want a full and complete 
documentation of these, which could be used later to condemn them?  
 Although the source material was derived from an alleged defector 
given the code name Caesar in terms of the photographs, media outlets focused 
upon the report conducted by the British law firm Carter-Ruck and Co was 
provided as being the basis of legitimacy and proof of what the photographs 
seemed to show. The law firm’s ‘investigation’52 was financed by Qatar, which has 
been actively working at overthrowing Assad and Libya’s Gaddafi before him. A 
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situation that media are aware that can affect the perceived legitimacy of the 
report, which is why they declare this interest. There is an attempt to whitewash 
the situation.  
 
The investigation and report undertaken by the British law firm was financed 
by Qatar, which likely explains the fact that it was made public concurrently with 
last week's Syria conference in Geneva. Qatar backs the Syrian rebels, but the 
country's stance does little to take away from the power of the images provided.
53
 
 
 This is an emotionally based appeal, rather than a purely logical one, 
as the clear clashes of interest and lack of objectivity are clearly apparent. In fact 
the quote mentions the “power of the images” and not whether the report is 
objective and reliable, which has implications for the photos. Other media refer to 
the report as an ‘independent’ study, something which it is clearly not. Thus the 
issue of not so hidden vested interests in behind the report are ignored.
54
 The case 
of Caesar also has very strong parallels with Iraq in the lead up to the 2003 war 
when defectors gave the US government ‘irrefutable’ proof that it wanted to hear 
about weapons of mass destruction, which were proven to be false in hindsight. 
This came with a continuing disastrous cost, but the desired regime change was 
achieved, Saddam Hussein was gone and an American-installed regime was in. Are 
things heading in the same direction again?  
Conclusion 
The one consistent goal for the US-led coalition has been regime change – 
the overthrow of Assad in favour of a more US friendly regime. This has followed 
the ‘typical’ Arab Spring scenario of ‘peaceful’ demonstrations by those seeking 
democracy and freedoms being violently broken up by a cruel dictator. The event 
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is characterised as a grassroots and locally owned and run revolution, by people 
seeking positive change, although the placards being carried by the protestors are 
often in English. The sides are painted as being good side – the revolutionaries, the 
bad side – the incumbent dictator and the political system. Symbolic support is 
offered to the rebels by the US-led ‘international community.’ If regime change 
does not occur quickly enough, the aspects of the military side of the operation are 
increased, for instance the NATO campaign against Gadaffi.  
 News is the primary means for many people that are physically remote 
from the events. The manner in which the news is produced and disseminated 
violates the basic cannons of any professional standards of journalism and/or 
fourth estate function. There is a lack of objectivity and verification, for example, 
which has been acknowledged by journalists themselves on occasion. Facts are not 
separated from values or opinions, and given the move to an infotainment format, 
it seems unlikely that the primary aim of the news media is to objectively inform 
the public.  
Rather, the intention seems to be related to the notions that underpin 
Bernay’s concept of engineers of consent. This is done by a very selective 
construction of news in an emotional and descriptive format that encourages its 
readers’, listeners’ or viewers’ to react in a specific manner to the news that has 
been identified as being important. Events and issues are covered in a very specific 
manner, where the conclusions reached should ideally support the policy that has 
been or is about to be proposed to resolve the matter. In this manner, the news is 
not random or unplanned but done with a sense of direction and purpose that 
shapes and frames public opinion.  
News has certainly been used extensively in the Syrian conflict to try and 
prime public opinion in the direction of permitting ‘humanitarian intervention’ in 
the shape of another military war. This depends on the perception held by the 
public as to who are the ‘good’ guys, who are the ‘bad’ guys, the inherent values of 
the conflict and the level of risk for Western countries that do get directly involved 
  
in the fighting. As noted by a number of media commentators, media have been 
conspicuous by their absence in this latest conflict too, failing the public in their 
moral duty and obligation as the fourth estate.  
This paper has only covered a very small and narrow part of the Syrian war, 
but nonetheless, has revealed a number of informational mechanisms and tactics 
that are designed to develop public consent for existing policy. The policy in this 
case is regime change, the primary question is how to set about achieving this in a 
practical sense. The military option was given a set back early on in the Syrian 
conflict, when the UN Security Council resolution that was identical to the one 
used on Libya, was vetoed.  
A chemical weapons attack on 21 August 2013 seemed to be the perfect 
occasion to resurrect the idea of open military aggression, after years of being 
behind the scenes arming, supplying, funding and training insurgent groups. But its 
timing seemed too perfect, coming three days after a UN inspection team had been 
allowed access to investigate chemical weapons attacks and after Obama’s remarks 
on creating a ‘red line’ on the use of chemical weapons. Familiar tactics were used 
– story of mass atrocity against a civilian target, the use of false and misleading 
information on the event. There was very little in the way of hard evidence, many 
points were vaguely and emotionally argued, circumstantial and relying on 
innuendo and stereotypes to have any credibility. Ultimately the lies and lack of 
credibility by the US-led charge for another war damaged their message, together 
with the fact that the public is war weary after over one decade of continuous war.  
 Stereotypes and prejudices against Assad and the Syrian government 
continue. This is meant to reinforce the notions of the good and bad sides of the 
conflict, which in reality is extremely blurred and lacking clear distinction. 
Ultimately, it is much easier for a public to be mobilised for war if they cannot 
empathize, understand and are reviled by side labelled as being ‘bad’. For instance, 
there have been regular criticisms being levelled at the Assad regime about their 
lack of cooperation and predictions that the plan to dismantle the chemical 
  
weapons stockpile will fail. This is in spite of many targets already being met, 
although the successes tend to be downplayed and minimised to try and project the 
negative more intensely. Blame is solely laid at the hands of Assad and his 
government, the so-called rebels are not judged or treated in the same manner. The 
framing of good and bad seems to be an attempt to try and mask the discrepancies 
in the vastly different treatment of the parities.  
 A final example given was that of the ‘industrial scale’ killing story. 
One more, the timing of the event seems to be very ‘convenient’ in terms of 
breaking just days before the Geneva II peace talks were scheduled to be held. 
Once more, the story is based upon circumstantial evidence at best, carried by a 
person that says he is a defector and that he has never actually seen any of the 
killing or torturing taking place. There are a number of parallels here to the case in 
Iraq, when the US used the ‘evidence’ and testimony of a defector in order to 
‘legitimise’ the launch of the desired military attack on the country. Media were 
also complicit in this event too, failing to mention in many cases that an 
‘independent’ report in to the photos veracity by a London law firm was actually 
commissioned by Qatar, a leading external actor that is working to overthrow 
Assad.  
 A problem for the US and its allies is that the rebel factions are not 
united and not strong enough to topple Assad by themselves. This creates a 
situation not dissimilar to Libya when NATO was required to use its airpower in 
order to achieve victory and finalise the regime change there. Syria is another 
matter, the military option is extremely difficult owing to its over use and abuse 
through such mechanisms as Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian 
Interventions. A lot of the informational deceit from past experiences, such as Iraq 
and Libya, has made the public more wary. This does not mean that the West shall 
stop trying to create a pretext to enable direct military intervention in Syria, owing 
to the fact that the current military stalemate is unlikely to be overcome by the 
  
rebels alone. The problem being, within the context of achieving regime change, 
what other effective avenues exist? 
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РАЗРАБОТКА МЕТОДИКИ СОЦИАЛЬНОГО АУДИТА КАДРОВОГО 
ПОТЕНЦИАЛА ОРГАНОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ВЛАСТИ 
Исследование выполнено при финансовой поддержке РГНФ в рамках проекта 
проведения научных исследований «Социальный аудит профессиональной деятельности 
государственных служащих», проект № 14-13-66005 
Проблема развития профессиональной компетентности и роста 
профессионализма государственных служащих является лейтмотивом 
федеральной и региональных программ реформирования государственной 
службы, в том числе областной государственной программы 
«Реформирование и развитие государственной гражданской службы 
Свердловской области (2010 - 2013 годы)» (далее – Программа). В цели 
программы указывается на формирование «кадрового состава 
государственной гражданской службы из высококвалифицированных 
